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The probabilistic notion of likelihood offers a systematic means of assessing “the relative merits 
of rival hypotheses in the light of observational or experimental data that bear upon them.”1 In 
particular, likelihood allows one to adjudicate among competing hypotheses by way of a two-
part principle: 
  
Law of Likelihood (LL):2 
(i) Evidence E supports hypothesis H1 over H2 just if 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻1) > 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻2), where 
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑖) is the likelihood of hypothesis Hi given evidence E. 
(ii) The degree to which E supports H1 over H2 is measured by the likelihood ratio, 
Λ = 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻2).  
 
The claims sanctioned by LL are strictly comparative. The principle does not say what you 
should believe or to what degree you should believe it. Rather, the notion of ‘supporting’ one 
hypothesis over another is contrastive and perhaps best characterized as a relation of ‘favoring’.3 
LL tells you how to determine the degree to which one hypothesis is favored over another on the 
basis of some evidence, E, and nothing more. Proponents of the principle are adamant that LL 
                                                 
1 A. W. F. Edwards, Likelihood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) p. 1. 
2 I am using Elliot Sober’s terminology here. The Law of Likelihood as I’ve presented it is to be 
distinguished from the weaker “Likelihood Principle,” which in most formulations is equivalent 
to part (i) of LL. I caution the reader that both the terms “Law of Likelihood” and “Likelihood 
Principle” are used ambiguously in the philosophy of statistics and inductive inference literature. 
3 Elliott Sober, Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
cannot provide sufficient grounds for apportioning belief, only ranking hypotheses in a particular 
evidentiary context. 
 
While LL has been defended at length as a general tool for both formal and informal reasoning 
about hypothesis ranking,4 there remains an important ambiguity its application. Intuitively, we 
ought to make use of all available information when assessing the relative merits of two 
hypotheses, not just the particular piece of evidence E under consideration. Any additional 
information already in our possession prior to obtaining E is typically referred to as background 
information. LL does not, on the face of it, tell us how to deal with such information. Some, most 
prominently Elliott Sober5, have argued that we ought to condition on this additional information 
when computing likelihoods. That is, if we denote the background information by B, then the 
likelihood ratio we should use is Λ = 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻1,𝐵)
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻2,𝐵). Taking this approach, however, means that Λ—
and thus our judgments concerning rival hypotheses H1 and H2—will depend on exactly which 
information is taken to constitute background information, and which is considered evidence and 
thus part of E. Under Sober’s interpretation, LL can be taken to yield different judgments for the 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Edwards, Likelihood; Ian Hacking, Logic of Statistical Inference (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1965); Sober, Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the 
Science. 
5 Elliott Sober, "The Design Argument," God and Design, ed. Neil Manson (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2003) 27-54; Sober, Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science; Elliott 
Sober, "Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential Transitivity in Connection 
with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-Tuning, and Firing Squads," Philosophical Studies 143 (2009): 63-90. 
same data when the line between evidence and background information is moved. The use of LL 
is thus encumbered by a “line-drawing problem.”6 
  
This line-drawing problem also appears in a slightly different guise in the literature on statistical 
inference. In this more restricted context, the problem manifests as an apparent ambiguity in the 
likelihood function. Specifically, there appears to be no systematic way of deciding which 
random variables and model parameters should be included in the likelihood function, and no 
principled way of deciding on which side of the conditionalization bar these quantities belong if 
included.7 As in the general case, the problem for the likelihoodist is to provide a principled 
division of propositions into background and evidence. 
  
A variety of solutions have been proposed to both versions of the problem of background 
information, though not always in these terms. Some, e.g. Jonathan Weisberg,8 attempt to 
provide a principled means of distinguishing evidence from background information. Others, e.g. 
Matthew Kotzen,9 attempt to dissolve the problem by scrapping LL. In the context of statistical 
                                                 
6 M. Kotzen, "Selection Biases in Likelihood Arguments," The British journal for the philosophy 
of science  (2012). 
7 See M. J. Bayarri, M. H. DeGroot and J. B. Kadane, "What Is the Likelihood Function?," 
Statistical Decision Theory and Related Topics Iv, eds. Shanti S. Gupta and James O. Berger, 
vol. 1 (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1987) 3-27.  
8 Jonathan Weisberg, "Firing Squads and Fine-Tuning: Sober on the Design Argument," British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2005): 809-21. 
9 Kotzen, "Selection Biases in Likelihood Arguments." 
inference, a common strategy is to disambiguate the likelihood function by fiat.10 I argue that 
none of these strategies is well-motivated. Background information is only problematic when 
one fails to distinguish between two related questions: (i) Given that I know B, to what degree 
does the additional piece of evidence E support H1 over H2? and (ii) to what degree does all the 
evidence to hand—B and E—support H1 over H2? My aim is to demonstrate that, once these 
questions are distinguished the very same considerations that motivate the adoption of LL entail 
distinct answers to both questions, thus resolving any ambiguity over the treatment of 
background information. Note that I am emphatically not offering a defense of LL as a general 
inference procedure. Mine is the more modest goal of dissolving an apparent defect of LL using 
the resources to which proponents of the principle already assent. 
 
To draw out the distinction relevant to eliminating the problem of background information, I will 
begin with a detailed example. I will then argue for an expression that represents the degree to 
which a particular piece of evidence supports one hypothesis over another in context, and then 
derive a related expression for the total support provided by all available evidence. Finally, I will 
show how these new expressions dissolve ambiguities in the treatment of background 
information by applying them to the so-called ‘fine-tuning argument’. 
 
I. ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Jason Grossman, "The Likelihood Principle," Philosophy of Statistics, eds. Malcolm 
R. Forster and Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay (Oxford, UK; Burlington, MA: North-Holland, 
2011). 
To draw out the distinction which I claim obviates the problem of background information, it 
will help to have a concrete example in mind. To avoid pre-conceived interpretations, I will 
intentionally eschew standard examples, at least at the outset. So rather than treat of fish or firing 
squads, I’ll consider carnivals.  
 
Suppose that Albert finds himself on the midway of an old-fashioned carnival. He decides to 
play one of the games—the one where contestants try to toss a ball into a milk-can. Albert is 
savvy about carnival games; he knows they are often rigged. In a fair game, there is a 50% 
chance of winning a prize. But when no authorities are around, there is an appreciable chance 
that the carnie running the game will hand him a ball too big to fit in the can, making it 
impossible to win. On the other hand, if there happens to be a police officer in sight the game is 
likely to be rigged in Albert’s favor—the carnies want the police to think the games are fair, so 
they arrange to let people win when the authorities are present. A set of probabilities reflecting 
these facts is provided by the joint distribution of Table 1.  
 
Table 1. 
 P = police present P = police absent 
 G = fair G = rigged G = fair G = rigged 
O = lose 1/20 1/20 1/10 11/20 
O = win 1/20 1/10 1/10 0 
 
 
Knowing all of the probabilities in Table 1, Albert puts his money down, and promptly tosses a 
ball into the can. Given that he has just won, what can Albert conclude about the game? 
Specifically, does he now have grounds to favor the hypothesis that the game is fair over the 
hypothesis that it is rigged? According to LL, Albert needs to compare two probabilities: the 
probability that he would win given that the game is fair, P(win| fair) and the probability that he 
would win given that the game is rigged P(win| rigged). Since P(win | fair) = 1/2  > P(win | 
rigged) = 1/7, LL asserts that Albert’s success in the game supports the hypothesis of a fair 
game—Albert has reason to think that he has played a fair game. 
 
But suppose that, before he tosses the ball, Albert notices a police officer standing near the 
booth. What can be said in light of this additional information? Here is where different 
interpretations of LL begin to diverge. According to Sober’s approach, we must recognize two 
sorts of propositions: evidence and background knowledge. Evidence is whatever fresh 
information we are currently considering when applying LL to distinguish among hypotheses. It 
appears to the left of the conditionalization bar when computing a likelihood. Background 
knowledge constitutes whatever we already know about the world, and is presumed to belong on 
the right side of the conditionalization bar. According to this view then, Albert should treat the 
fact of the police officer’s presence as background knowledge and condition on this information. 
The relevant likelihoods are now P(win| fair, present) = 1/2 and P(win| rigged, present) = 2/3. 
With the additional information, he should now favor the hypothesis that the game is rigged—the 
background information has reversed our ordering on hypotheses.  
 
That we should take all available information into account when comparing hypotheses is not 
especially controversial—most authors assume some sort of principle of total evidence.11 What 
is controversial is how and whether ‘evidence’ should be distinguished from background 
information. It is not clear why Albert should treat the information that a police officer was 
present any differently than the information that he won the game. Albert might just have well 
have treated the observation of the police officer as the evidence, and conditioned instead on the 
fact that he won: P(present | rigged, win) = 1 > P(present | fair, win) = 1/3. In this way of 
accounting for all the information, LL still favors the hypothesis that the game is rigged, but does 
so to a much greater degree. Alternatively, Albert might have treated all the information at hand 
as ‘evidence’ and compared the following likelihoods: P(win, present | fair) = 1/6 > P(win, 
present | rigged) = 1/7. Taking this approach once again inverts the ordering of hypotheses, and 
favors the hypothesis that the game was fair. It might appear then that LL must be modified in 
order to provide a principled means of discriminating background information from evidence. 
However, no such modification is required—a careful interpretation of LL as it stands obviates 
the question of evidence versus background information. 
 
II. THE PIECEWISE IMPACT OF EVIDENCE 
To resolve the ambiguity over background information, we need to distinguish between two 
questions: (i) to what degree does learning a particular fact in the context of an additional set of 
facts support a given hypothesis? and (ii) to what degree does learning a particular fact in 
conjunction with an additional set of facts support a given hypothesis? In terms of the midway 
                                                 
11 Rudolph Carnap, "On the Application of Inductive Logic," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 8, 1 (1947): 133-48. 
example above, the distinction can be made as follows: (i) to what degree does winning the game 
having already learned that a police officer is present support the hypothesis that the game is 
fair? and (ii) to what degree does the full set of information at hand—that Albert has won the 
game and that a police officer was present—support the hypothesis that the game is fair? 
 
To address question (i), we need to examine the piecewise introduction of evidence, taking care 
to note one important fact: learning the truth of a proposition (or the value of a random variable) 
is effectively an intervention that changes the background distribution describing the ways the 
world might be. To begin with, let’s assume that we are given a full joint distribution reflecting 
all relevant aspects of the world and nothing else—there is nothing given that might qualify as 
either evidence or background information. For ease of exposition, I will further assume that this 
distribution is discrete, though nothing about my derivation hinges on this being the case. 
 
 Since all we have is the distribution and no information to sort out, LL can be applied 
unambiguously upon obtaining our first piece of evidence, I1. According to LL, the degree to 
which this information supports hypothesis H1 over H2 is given by the likelihood ratio Λ(𝐼1) =
𝑃(𝐼1|𝐻1) 𝑃(𝐼1|𝐻2)⁄ . Furthermore, on learning that I1 is the case, the space of possible events has 
been reduced—acquiring information requires us to update the background distribution with 
which we started. Specifically, the probability of I1 being the case must now be unity, 
irrespective of the value it had prior to learning this outcome. One way to represent the change is 
to construct a new event space by simply removing all the events incompatible with the fact that 
I1 is the case while preserving the relative measure on all remaining events. That is, the new 
distribution 𝑃1(α), where α is any event in the original event space compatible with I1, is 
obtained from the old distribution by the following relation: 𝑃1(𝛼) = 𝑃(𝛼|𝐼1).12 In the midway 
example, for instance, when Albert learned that a police officer was present he should have 
replaced the original distribution of Table 1 with that of Table 2. 
 
Table 2. 
 P = police present 
 G = fair G = rigged 
O = lose 1/5 1/5 
O = win 1/5 2/5 
 
 
Once we realize that we are working with a new distribution, there is no need to draw a line 
between background information and evidence—our prior information is reflected in the new 
distribution. When additional evidence, I2, is acquired, we need only appeal to LL just as we did 
at the outset. This time, however, we are assessing likelihoods with respect to the currently 
applicable distribution 𝑃1(α). So the evidence I2, if we take LL seriously, supports H1 over H2 
just if 𝑃1(𝐼2|𝐻1) > 𝑃1(𝐼2|𝐻2) and does so to a degree Λ(I2) = 𝑃1(𝐼2|𝐻1) 𝑃1(𝐼2|𝐻2)⁄ . In terms of 
the original joint distribution, we can express this likelihood ratio as 
Λ(I2) = 𝑃(𝐼2|𝐼1,𝐻1) 𝑃(𝐼2|𝐼1,𝐻2)⁄ . 
 
                                                 
12 This is simply the updating procedure recommended by Bayesian epistemology. It is invoked 
here without any commitment to the subjective or objective status of priors. 
As before, when we learn I2, we must update our distribution to reflect this restriction of the 
possibilities. This new distribution 𝑃2(β) is obtained from the old distribution in the same way as 
above: 𝑃2(𝛽) = 𝑃1(𝛽|𝐼2) = 𝑃(𝛽|𝐼2, 𝐼1). This is easy to generalize for an indefinite sequence of 
evidence: once we’ve learned I1, I2, …, In-1, we should compute the likelihoods involving a new 
piece of evidence In using the distribution 𝑃𝑛−1(𝛾) = 𝑃(𝛾|𝐼𝑛−1, … , 𝐼1). The new piece of 
information In introduced in the context of prior information I1, I2,…, In-1 supports H1 over H2 
just if 𝑃(𝐼𝑛|𝐼𝑛−1, … , 𝐼1,𝐻1) > 𝑃(𝐼𝑛|𝐼𝑛−1, … , 𝐼1,𝐻2) and does so to the degree 
 
(1) Λ(𝐼𝑛) = 𝑃(𝐼𝑛|𝐼𝑛−1,…,𝐼1,𝐻1)𝑃(𝐼𝑛|𝐼𝑛−1,…,𝐼1,𝐻2). 
 
The point is that whenever we acquire a piece of information we can apply LL without 
modification, but must do so using a distribution that reflects all of the facts already in evidence. 
Put this way, there is no ambiguity in using LL—we always compute a straightforward 
likelihood. However, when this likelihood is expressed in terms of the original joint distribution 
with which we started, each successive likelihood is conditioned on the previous facts. So by 
applying LL and taking care to note the way in which the acquisition of information forces a 
change in distribution, we have found that in order to determine the relative support of one 
hypothesis over another provided some particular piece of evidence, we must use likelihoods 
conditioned on all previously acquired facts. 
 
Thus far, it may seem that I have been arguing for Sober’s interpretation of LL. However, Sober 
seems to view the likelihood ratio (1) as representing the overall degree to which H1 is supported 
over H2 once In is obtained. I have been urging that, if we take LL at face value, this is not how 
we should interpret this expression. At every stage in the above derivation, we were applying LL 
to determine the degree to which a particular piece of evidence supported one hypothesis over 
another. Other information was relevant, but only in determining the epistemic context in which 
this degree of support was determined. I am suggesting that Sober has the right expression but 
gives it in answer to the wrong question—in what follows, I’ll show that LL leads us to a very 
different expression for the degree of support for H1 over H2 provided by the totality of evidence. 
 
III. TOTAL SUPPORT 
There are two ways to argue for an expression of the likelihood ratio pertaining to the totality of 
available evidence. In one approach, we could take the expression given in (1) for the degree to 
which a particular piece of evidence supports H1 over H2 and couple this with a function for 
combining likelihood ratios—a function measuring the overall degree to which two pieces of 
evidence support H1 over H2. Strictly speaking, this means adding to LL since the principle does 
not provide such a rule. However, there are some reasonable constraints we can put on such a 
function without begging the question concerning background information. For starters, 
whatever function f we choose should itself yield a likelihood ratio, meaning that it must map 
pairs of likelihoods to the interval [0, ∞). Furthermore, if either likelihood in the combination is 
zero—implying that one hypothesis has been entirely ruled out—then the joint likelihood should 
also be zero. The function should be symmetric since it ought not to matter in what order we give 
the likelihoods to be combined, and it should be an increasing function of both arguments. An 
obvious choice satisfying all of these constraints is simply the product of the component 
likelihoods. That is, given Λ1 and Λ2, the combined likelihood is given by 𝑓(Λ1,Λ2) = Λ1Λ2. 
With this rule for combining likelihoods, we can use the results of the last section to derive an 
expression for the overall degree to which the facts I1, I2, …, In support one hypothesis over 
another, assuming they were learned in sequence: 
(2) Λ(𝐼1, 𝐼2, … , 𝐼𝑛) = Λ(𝐼1)Λ(𝐼2)⋯Λ(𝐼𝑛) = 𝑃(𝐼1|𝐻1)𝑃(𝐼2|𝐻1,𝐼1)⋯𝑃(𝐼𝑛|𝐻1 ,𝐼1,…,𝐼𝑛−1)𝑃(𝐼1|𝐻2)𝑃(𝐼2|𝐻2,𝐼1)⋯𝑃(𝐼𝑛|𝐻2 ,𝐼1,…,𝐼𝑛−1) 
Using nothing but the rules of probability, the right hand side of equation (2) can be written 
much more compactly to give the following expression for the total support of the facts I1, I2, …, 
In:  
(3) Λ(𝐼1, 𝐼2, … , 𝐼𝑛) = 𝑃( 𝐼1,…,𝐼𝑛|𝐻1)𝑃( 𝐼1,…,𝐼𝑛|𝐻2) 
Of course, the right-hand side of equation (3) is just the expression we would have gotten by 
applying LL to the proposition I1^I2^…^In with respect to the initial joint distribution—in a 
straightforward reading, it is just the total support for H1 over H2 provided by the conjunction of 
all available evidence. 
 
The form of Equation (3) suggests that it might have been derived more directly by appealing to 
LL without worrying about how to determine the contextual support provided by each piece of 
information or introducing a way to combine these (thus justifying my claim that we need not 
modify LL). All we had to do was note that, if we let 𝐸 = 𝐼1^𝐼2^ … ^𝐼𝑛, then LL immediately 
yields (3). From (3) we could then deduce (2) just from the rules of the probability calculus. 
Once we identified the factors of the right-hand side of Equation (2) with individual likelihood 
ratios, we could have used this fact to justify a rule for combining likelihoods. In fact, this is 
what A. F. Edwards does, at least in the special case of independent evidence, in his development 
of the likelihood framework.13 Viewed from this perspective, Equation (3) is implicit in LL. 
                                                 
13 Edwards, Likelihood. 
Whichever approach we take to justifying this rule for assessing total support, we are led to the 
following amplified form of LL: 
 
 
Amplified Law of Likelihoods (ALL): 
(i) If it is already known to be that case that I1^I2^…^ In, then learning evidence E 
supports hypothesis H1 over H2 just if 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻1, 𝐼1, 𝐼2, … , 𝐼𝑛) > 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻2, 𝐼1, 𝐼2, … , 𝐼𝑛), 
where 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑖 , 𝐼1, 𝐼2, … , 𝐼𝑛) is the likelihood of hypothesis Hi given evidence E in the 
context of I1^I2^…^ In. 
(ii) The degree to which E supports H1 over H2 in the context of I1^I2^…^ In is measured 
by the likelihood ratio Λ = 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻1,𝐼1,𝐼2,…,𝐼𝑛)
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻2,𝐼1,𝐼2,…,𝐼𝑛).  
(iii) The total evidence E^ I1^I2^…^ In supports hypothesis H1 over H2 just if 
𝑃(𝐸, 𝐼1, 𝐼2, … , 𝐼𝑛|𝐻1) > 𝑃(𝐸, 𝐼1, 𝐼2, … , 𝐼𝑛|𝐻2). 
(iv) The degree to which the total evidence E^ I1^I2^…^ In supports H1 over H2 is 
measured by the likelihood ratio Λ = 𝑃(𝐸,𝐼1,𝐼2,…,𝐼𝑛|𝐻1)
𝑃(𝐸,𝐼1,𝐼2,…,𝐼𝑛|𝐻2).  
 
With ALL, we can answer the questions posed above concerning the midway example. The 
information that Albert has won the game, acquired after learning that a police officer is present, 
supports the hypothesis that the game is rigged because 𝑃(win|present, rigged) >
𝑃(win|present, fair). According to ALL (ii), this information favors the rigged hypothesis over 
its rival to a degree Λ = 𝑃(win|present, rigged)
𝑃(win|present, fair) = 2312 = 43. This one piece of information, in the context 
of previously established information about the presence of police officers, tends to favor the 
hypothesis of a rigged game. However, the aggregate information—that a police officer is 
present and Albert has won the game—favors the hypothesis that the game is fair. This follows 
from ALL (iii) and (iv) since 𝑃(win, present| fair)
𝑃(win, present| rigged) = 1617 = 76. This looks like a contradiction until we 
realize that the first piece of information obtained—that the police officer is present—strongly 
favored the hypothesis that the game is fair: 𝑃(present|fair)
𝑃(present|rigged) = 149 . The upshot is that the aggregate 
effect of the totality of evidence can differ from the piecewise impact of each bit of evidence. 
Rather than being a contradiction, this is precisely how one would expect these two distinct 
measures to relate—the total support for the fair hypothesis is simply the product of the 
contextual likelihood ratios for each piece of evidence.14  
 
IV. KICKING AWAY THE FULL DISTRIBUTION LADDER 
In the preceding arguments, I made extensive use of full probability distributions. This appears 
problematic since the appealing feature of the likelihood approach—and that which sets it apart 
from Bayesianism—is its disregard for prior probabilities. However, I claim that the likelihoodist 
who thinks that prior probabilities are often absent or unattainable might nonetheless justify LL 
or ALL. To see how, let’s reconsider the case in which we start with a full prior distribution 
P(α), and then obtain evidence I1. Once we acquire the evidence, we should update the 
probabilities assigned to H1 and H2 by setting each new probability equal to the corresponding 
conditional probability assigned by the original distribution: 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that, while the order in which information is learned determines the degree 
to which each additional piece of information favors one hypothesis over another, order is 
irrelevant when considering the overall support conferred by the totality of evidence. 
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What can we now say about the degree to which I1 favors H1 over H2? One way we might 
understand this question is in terms of a hypothetical. Suppose that either H1 or H2 is true. Then 
the initial odds in favor of H1 are simply P(H1|H1∨H2)/P(~H1|H1∨H2) = P(H1)/P(H2). How does 
the new information change the odds in favor of H1? In this case, the posterior odds are given by: 
(4) 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 11 21 1 1 2 1 2 2
,~ ,P H I H H P I H P H P HI P HP H I H H P I H P H∨ = = Λ∨  
The right-hand equality in Equation (4) indicates that all of the work to shift the posterior odds 
up or down relative to our prior odds is being done by the likelihood ratio, Λ(I1). In other words, 
the change in posterior odds is a function of Λ(I1). To put it still another way, the effect of I1 on 
the odds is entirely determined by Λ(I1). This fact motivates adopting the likelihood function as a 
measure of relative support. While the likelihood ratio cannot tell us which posterior probability 
is higher, it can tell us how the odds shift in favor of one hypothesis or the other, assuming that 
one or the other is right. Furthermore, it does so whether or not we know the prior probabilities. 
In this sense, LL is a general guide to differential support, and in those cases in which we have 
no objective basis for assigning priors, the likelihoodist claims it is our only guide.  
 
By considering effects on posterior odds, we can motivate ALL in much the same way as LL. As 
before, the full distribution (if we knew it to begin with) after learning I1 would be given by 
P1(α) = P(α|I1). If we now learn that I2 is the case, then we must change our posterior odds in 
favor of H1 over H2 to the following: 
(5) 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 12 1 21 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
,,P H I H H P I H P H P HI P HP H I H H P I H P H∨ = = Λ∨  
Once again, it is the likelihood function that increases (or decreases) the posterior over the prior 
odds. This time, however, it is in the context of the new distribution P1(α), a distribution 
reflecting prior knowledge of I1. If the motivation offered for LL in the first place is compelling, 
then it seems we must also accept ALL (i) and (ii)—the relative support for H1 over H2 conferred 
by the new piece of evidence I2 after already learning I1 is indicated by the likelihood function, 
Λ(I2) = P1(I2|H1)/P1(I2|H2) = P(I2|I1, H1)/P(I2|I1,H2). But what about the overall support for H1 
over H2 given our epistemic starting point? How should our posterior odds have changed relative 
to our initial odds as a result of learning I1 and I2? We can rewrite the right-hand side of Equation 
(5) as follows: 
(6) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1
1 2 1 1
1 2 2 2
11 2 2
,,,,,
P I H P H P I H I P H IP I H P H P I H I P H IP I I H P HP I I H P HP HI I P H
=
=
= Λ
 
Written this way, we can see that the combined likelihood function Λ(I1, I2) determines the 
change in odds relative to what they were before learning anything at all. So once again, we can 
kick away the ladder of the full distribution. If we did know the distribution, then learning I1 and 
I2 would change the odds in favor of H1 over H2 by an amount given by the likelihood ratio. 
Since this is true irrespective of what the priors are, we can always take the likelihood alone to 
indicate differential support, in this case the degree of support for H1 over H2 conferred by the 
totality of evidence. 
  
Of course, one might object to my interpretation of what it is to favor one hypothesis over 
another. Instead, one might attempt to prove LL(i) from other premises15 and take the 
quantitative measure of contrastive support given by LL (ii) to be a postulate that stands or falls 
with how well the results coincide with our intuitions.16 ALL could then be motivated by the 
second line of argument I suggested in the previous section: treat all information as evidence and 
note that the resulting likelihood ratio factors into a product of likelihoods, each of which can be 
consistently interpreted as corresponding to the impact of a single piece of information. 
 
The point is that insofar as LL is well-motivated, so too is ALL. My use of full distributions 
above was strictly heuristic. Once we’ve seen what role the likelihood function plays and which 
likelihood function is relevant to which question, we can ignore the full distribution. Of course, 
the proponent of LL or ALL can only claim to be free of worrisome priors if conditional 
probabilities can be taken as primitive.17 It is not my task here to defend that claim and thus 
rescue likelihoodism from the charge of subjectivity. My more modest assertion is simply that if 
we have grounds to take LL seriously, then we should really embrace ALL. Once we’ve done so, 
it becomes clear that whatever problems likelihoodism has, line-drawing isn’t one of them. 
 
V. BUT WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION? 
                                                 
15 See Grossman, "The Likelihood Principle." 
16 See Sober, Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science. 
17 For a defense of taking conditional probabilities as primitives, see ibid. 
My arguments so far have concerned the problem of background information as it appears in the 
literature on LL in its broadest epistemic use. As I mentioned above, the same problem arises in 
the more restricted context of statistical inference. Addressing this narrower community, Bayarri, 
De Groot, and Kadane famously asked, “What is the likelihood function?”18 To illustrate the 
ambiguity in answering that question, the authors consider a case analogous to one in which, 
with respect to each possible value of some discrete parameter θ characterizing a statistical 
model, a random variable X has a conditional probability distribution P(x|θ).19 Furthermore, it is 
not the random variable X that is observed, but rather some other random variable Y for which 
P(y|x, θ). The authors then ask, “What is the [likelihood function] in this problem?”.20 They 
claim that there are three candidates, P(y|θ), P(x, y|θ), and P(y|x, θ), and that a “subjective 
judgment must be made in order to decide which of the functions…to use in a given problem.”21 
The thesis I’ve been defending is that this is simply false. The question has two parts: (i) which 
random variables and parameters are to be included in the likelihood function, and (ii) which side 
of the conditionalization bar each belongs on. The answer to both parts, according to ALL, 
depends on two things: what hypotheses we wish to consider and whether we wish to assess the 
impact of a particular piece of data in context or the aggregate of all data. So, for instance, 
suppose we wish to ask about hypotheses concerning the value of θ in light of the only piece of 
                                                 
18 Bayarri, DeGroot and Kadane, "What Is the Likelihood Function?." 
19 The original example was stated in terms of probability densities since θ typically takes a 
continuum of values. To keep the discussion consistent, I’ve assumed that θ is discrete, and thus 
the distributions in question are discrete as well. 
20 Bayarri, DeGroot and Kadane, "What Is the Likelihood Function?,"   at p. 6. 
21 Ibid., 6. 
evidence available, namely a value y of Y. Then the relevant likelihood function must have the 
form P(y|θ). If on the other hand, we wanted to consider finer-grained hypotheses concerning 
both the value of θ and the unobserved random variable X, then we would have functions of the 
form P(y|x, θ). Under no circumstances would ALL entail the use of a likelihood function of the 
form P(x|…) unless a value of the random variable X was observed (or otherwise learned) and 
thus added to our store of facts. Suppose X and Y were both observed and we wish to know the 
relative support given to hypotheses about θ. Then our likelihood functions would look like 
P(x,y|θ). Suppose instead, we learned the value of Y and then the value of X and wish to know 
what impact learning X = x has given what we already know about Y. Then the likelihood 
functions would have the form P(x|y, θ). I’m belaboring the point, but I want to make it clear that 
ALL unambiguously selects a set of variables and parameter values and distributes these around 
the conditionalization bar. There are many further objections raised by Bayarri et al to the use of 
LL as a statistical inference method, in particular problems with prediction. However, many of 
these objections conflate LL (or ALL) with the method of maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE). A discussion of the relation of MLE to ALL is beyond the scope of this paper, and so too 
are the remaining objections to likelihoodism. It suffices here to note that there is no ambiguity 
in factoring the likelihood function as far as ALL is concerned. The principle may not be right, 
but it is unambiguous.22 
                                                 
22 The authors might object that in my initial discussion of ALL, I used a full distribution which 
dictates all the relevant quantities and so implicitly settles the question of which likelihood 
function to use. But as I argued in the last section, a full distribution is unnecessary for 
motivating ALL. Rather, in the likelihoodist view, specifying a question of interest specifies a 
  
VI. FISH, FIRING SQUADS, AND FINE-TUNING 
The question of how to handle background information is especially pressing in the context of 
the fine-tuning argument (FTA). The FTA attempts to establish the existence of a cosmic 
designer by noting that various physical constants have values within a narrow range amenable 
to the occurrence of carbon-based life—the laws appear ‘fine-tuned’ for life. For instance, had 
the 7.65 MeV energy level of the C12 nucleus been slightly lower or higher, then the process that 
produces carbon and the other heavy elements essential to life in the interior of stars would not 
have occurred.23 Denote by E the observation that many constants occurring in physical laws 
take values within a comparatively narrow range that permits life to exist, and consider the 
following two hypotheses: 
HC:  The relevant physical constants acquired their values by chance. 
HD: The relevant physical constants acquired their values by design. 
The FTA is usually presented as a likelihood argument. If we appeal to LP and note that 
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝐷) > 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝐶), then we must conclude that the evidence favors design over chance. 
A prominent objection to the fine-tuning argument notes that we have left out an important piece 
of information: all knowledge concerning physical constants has been acquired by carbon-based 
                                                                                                                                                             
likelihood ratio which in turn constrains what full distributions the Bayesian (or anyone else 
committed to using full distributions) may consider. 
23 John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986) pp. 252-53. 
life forms.24 Call this fact I. We must account for all available background information—so the 
objection goes—and so we must condition our likelihoods on I. However, since I entails E, both 
hypotheses have the same likelihood given the evidence: 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝐷 , 𝐼) = 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝐶 , 𝐼) = 1. Thus, 
the evidence cannot favor design over chance (or any other hypothesis for that matter). This 
objection, however, conflates the two questions with which we began and emphasizes the need 
for the clarification provided by ALL.  
 
To motivate an analysis of the FTA in terms of ALL, it will help to first consider a pair of 
structurally similar examples endemic in the literature. The first of these, due originally to Sir 
Arthur Eddington,25 asks us to think about fishing. Suppose we are confronted with the following 
observation: 
Ef: All 10 of the fish caught in the lake today were longer than 10 inches. 
For the sake of simplicity, suppose that we consider only two hypotheses that might account for 
this evidence: 
 H100:  All of the fish in the lake are longer than 10 inches. 
 H50: Half of the fish in the lake are longer 10 inches. 
If this was all the information we had, LP would urge us to favor H100 since 𝑃�𝐸𝑓�𝐻100� ≫
𝑃�𝐸𝑓�𝐻50�. However, suppose we had some additional information: 
 I>10: The net used has holes 10 inches wide. 
                                                 
24 Sober, "The Design Argument."; Sober, "Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: 
Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-Tuning, and Firing Squads." 
25 A. Eddington, The Philosophy of Physical Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1947). 
This new information I>10 entails Ef. Thus, if we account for this new information by 
conditioning on it as Sober would urge, we find that the evidence fails to distinguish between the 
hypotheses at all: 𝑃�𝐸𝑓�𝐻100, 𝐼>10 � = 𝑃�𝐸𝑓�𝐻50, 𝐼>10 � = 1. According to Sober, this constitutes 
an Observation Selection Effect (OSE) because the method by which the observation was 
obtained biased the outcome. One is faced with an OSE whenever accounting for the process by 
which an observation was made alters the likelihoods that determine the degree to which the 
observation favors one hypothesis over another. In this case, the effect is extreme.  
 
The picture changes dramatically when we analyze this scenario using ALL. It becomes 
immediately obvious that the likelihoods being compared— 𝑃�𝐸𝑓�𝐻100, 𝐼>10 � and 
𝑃�𝐸𝑓�𝐻50, 𝐼>10 �—represent only the degree to which learning about the day’s catch supports 
either H100 or H50 in the context of information about the net used. These do not represent the 
degree to which the aggregate evidence supports one or the other hypothesis. It is true that 
learning E after learning what net was used fails to further discriminate between H100 and H50. 
But learning I>10 may have already discriminated between the two, and thus, according to ALL, 
the aggregate information might also discriminate between the two hypotheses.  
 
To illustrate the point, consider the joint distribution in Table 3. I’ve added a proposition, I>0, 
which is the claim that the net used had very tiny holes capable of catching the smallest fish. 
With this additional possibility added, the probabilities given are compatible with all of the facts 
above. In particular, 𝑃�𝐸𝑓�𝐻100� = 1 ≫ 𝑃�𝐸𝑓�𝐻50� = .003 and  𝑃�𝐸𝑓�𝐻100, 𝐼>10� =
𝑃�𝐸𝑓�𝐻50, 𝐼>10� = 1.  
 Table 3. 
 H100 H50 
 I>0 I>10 I>0 I>10 
Ef .001 .002 .001 .002 
¬ Ef 0 0 .994 0 
 
However, we can see that learning I>10 at the outset strongly favored the hypothesis H100 since 
𝑃(𝐼>10|𝐻100) = 0.67 ≫ 𝑃(𝐼>10|𝐻50) = 0.002. Likewise, according to ALL (iv), the aggregate 
information overwhelmingly favors H100 over H50 to a degree given by 
Λ = 𝑃�𝐸𝑓 , 𝐼>10�𝐻100� 𝑃�𝐸𝑓 , 𝐼>10�𝐻50� = 334� . This conclusion is not surprising given the 
details of the example. The distribution given in Table 3 is plausible in that those who frequently 
fish a particular lake are more likely to use nets with large holes if the lake contains mostly large 
fish—they may not know the distribution of fish in the lake, but they know what works. 
Whatever story one might tell to account for the particular probabilities in this case, the upshot is 
that if an OSE renders a particular observation irrelevant in a particular context it is still possible 
for the aggregate information to discriminate between hypotheses. 
 
While Eddington’s fishing example illustrates the way in which previously acquired information 
can deprive subsequent evidence of relevance, there is another example in the literature more 
closely analogous to the fine-tuning case.26 This scenario involves firing squads. We are asked to 
imagine that a firing squad staffed by twelve expert marksmen takes aim at the prisoner to be 
executed. Each marksman fires twelve times when given the signal. When the smoke clears, we 
discover that the prisoner is still unharmed. Call the fact of this surprising survival Es. In this 
case, we are interested in what the prisoner can infer from Es concerning the following two 
hypotheses: 
Hcon:  The marksmen conspired at time t1 to spare the prisoner’s life when they fired  
at t2. 
 Hmiss: The marksmen decided at time t1 to shoot the prisoner when they fired at t2 but  
missed by chance. 
 
At first we might think that the prisoner has ample reason to favor Hcon over Hmiss since, given 
that these are expert marksmen, 𝑃(𝐸𝑠|𝐻𝑐𝑜𝑛) ≫ 𝑃(𝐸𝑠|𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠). However, in making his analysis 
the prisoner left out some pertinent information about the manner in which the observation of Es 
was made: 
IO: At t3 the prisoner made the observation that he is still alive. 
According to those who would single out background information, we must incorporate IO into 
the likelihoods by conditioning. In this view, the prisoner suffers from an OSE and cannot 
distinguish between the two hypotheses at all since 𝑃(𝐸𝑠|𝐻𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝐼𝑂) = 𝑃(𝐸𝑠|𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠 , 𝐼𝑂) = 1. 
Because IO entails Es, so the argument goes, learning Es can tell the prisoner nothing about which 
                                                 
26 The scenario was introduced in John Leslie, Universes (London: Routledge, 1989). and 
elaborated in Richard Swinburne, "Arguments from the Fine-Tuning of the Universe," Physical 
Cosmology and Philosophy, ed. J. Leslie (New York: MacMillan, 1990) 160-79. 
hypothesis to favor. Thus, the prisoner in the grip of a strong OSE cannot reasonably conclude 
there was a conspiracy to save his life. 
 
At this point, the tight analogy with the FTA should be clear. The prisoner stands in for us 
carbon-based life forms. While the prisoner is attempting to assess whether design or chance is 
responsible for his survival, in the FTA we are attempting to infer design in the cosmos. In both 
cases, it has been objected that the observer suffers from an OSE that prevents discrimination 
between hypotheses. Supporters of the FTA invoke the firing-squad scenario because they think 
that our intuition strongly opposes the OSE objection—surely the prisoner can reasonably 
conclude that conspiracy is the better hypothesis. By analogy, they claim that we can conclude 
that an OSE is not a problem for the FTA.  
 
In both cases, ALL tells us that the role of the OSE has been misinterpreted. It is true that, in the 
context of knowing that it was himself who made the observation, the prisoner learns nothing 
further by noting that he is alive. Likewise, it is the case that, knowing that all physics is done by 
carbon-based life forms, we learn nothing further by discovering that the constants of physical 
law are just right to sustain carbon-based life. Nonetheless, the aggregate information might still 
favor one hypothesis over the other. In the firing-squad scenario, it is eminently plausible that 
𝑃(𝐸𝑠, 𝐼𝑂|𝐻𝑐𝑜𝑛) ≫ 𝑃(𝐸𝑠, 𝐼𝑂|𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠). In the case of fine-tuning, it may be that 𝑃(𝐸, 𝐼|𝐻𝐷) >
𝑃(𝐸, 𝐼|𝐻𝐶). This will be the case if 𝑃(𝐼|𝐻𝐷) > 𝑃(𝐼|𝐻𝐶). I certainly do not wish to argue that this 
is in fact the case—there seem to be insurmountable difficulties in providing a well-defined 
measure corresponding to 𝑃(𝐼|𝐻𝐷).27 My point is just that, when one distinguishes between 
contextual and total support, the presence of an OSE does not prove fatal to design arguments in 
either the firing-squad or FTA case. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Insofar as one is inclined to accept LL as a framework for inference, no modification is 
necessary in order to deal with background information—unpacking LL leads to ALL. The 
interpretive key  is the discrimination of two questions, one concerning the immediate support 
provided by a piece of evidence in context and one concerning the overall support provided by 
the total set of evidence. Looked at in this way, it becomes clear that objections based on 
observer bias are not necessarily fatal to the FTA. It is true that we, as carbon-based life-forms, 
cannot use the fact that some physical constants are just right for the existence of carbon-based 
life to discriminate between design hypotheses and their rivals. However, it may be the case that 
the aggregate evidence (including the fact of our existence) might permit such discrimination. 
Whether this is the case must be settled on other grounds. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 It is not clear that the question of fine-tuning is even well-posed. There is reason to reject the 
strong metaphysical assumptions necessary to make the possibility of different ‘constants’ in the 
laws of nature meaningful or to entertain the existence of processes—whether physical or 
divine—that determined those constants in the past. 
